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Unclogging Courts by Targeting Litigant Incentives: The Case of the Brazilian Labour Justice Reform
Bulletin of Latin American Research ( IF 0.777 ) Pub Date : 2022-09-18 , DOI: 10.1111/blar.13396
Caio Castelliano 1 , Peter Grajzl 2 , Eduardo Watanabe 3
Affiliation  

Overburdened courts hinder economic and social progress, yet successful court reforms are rare. Instead of boosting judicial resources or adapting procedure, Brazil tackled persistent backlogs and delays in its labour courts by replacing the pre-existing each-pays-their-own-costs (American) rule for allocation of litigation expenses with an alternative loser-pays-all (English) rule. Using a newly assembled court-level panel dataset and difference-in-differences approach, we show that the reform alleviated the courts' demand pressures and, most importantly, increased court efficacy in both adjudication and enforcement. The Brazilian experience offers valuable policy lessons about viable court reforms for other jurisdictions.

中文翻译:

通过针对诉讼激励措施疏通法院:巴西劳动司法改革案例

法院负担过重阻碍了经济和社会进步,但成功的法院改革却很少见。巴西没有增加司法资源或调整程序,而是通过用败诉方付费的替代规则取代了先前存在的“各人自付费用”(美国)的诉讼费用分配规则,解决了劳动法庭持续积压和拖延的问题。所有(英语)规则。使用新组装的法院级专家组数据集和双重差分法,我们表明改革减轻了法院的需求压力,最重要的是,提高了法院在审判和执行方面的效率。巴西的经验为其他司法管辖区的可行法院改革提供了宝贵的政策教训。
更新日期:2022-09-18
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