What should we think about ‘acts of conscience’, viz., cases where our personal judgments and public authority come into conflict such that principled resistance to the latter seems necessary? Philosophers mainly debate two issues: the Accommodation Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, should public authority accommodate claims of conscience?’ and the Justification Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, are we justified in engaging in acts of conscience – and why?’. By contrast, a third important topic – the Conduct Question, i.e., ‘How should we act, morally speaking, when engaging in acts of conscience?’ – has been mostly neglected. This paper aims to offer concrete guidance for persons wishing to engage in acts of conscience in morally virtuous ways. I argue that such agents are subject to two basic prima facie duties: (i) duties to oneself related to demands of integrity and (ii) duties to others related to demands of civility. I explain both duties in detail, arguing with regard to (i), that in light of what I call ‘the paradox of conscience’, we need to rethink our views about both ‘conscience’ and ‘integrity’; and with regard to (ii), that, building upon Rawls’ ‘duty of civility’, we should embrace at least seven general principles for undertaking acts of conscience in a morally conscientious manner.

我们应该如何看待“良心行为”，即我们的个人判断和公共权威发生冲突以致有必要对后者进行原则性抵抗的情况？哲学家们主要争论两个问题：适应问题，即“如果有的话，公共当局应该在什么时候适应良心主张？” 以及正当性问题，即“我们何时（如果有的话）有正当理由从事良心行为——为什么？”。相比之下，第三个重要主题——行为问题，即，“从道德上讲，当我们从事良心行为时，我们应该如何行动？” ——大多被忽视了。本文旨在为希望以道德美德的方式从事良心行为的人提供具体指导。我认为，这些代理人须履行两项基本的表面职责：（i）与诚信要求相关的对自己的责任和（ii）与文明要求相关的对他人的责任。我详细解释了这两项职责，就 (i) 进行了争论，鉴于我所说的“良心悖论”，我们需要重新思考我们对“良心”和“诚信”的看法；关于（ii），在罗尔斯的“文明义务”的基础上，我们应该至少包含七项一般原则，以在道德上尽责的方式进行良心行为。