Purpose

This paper aims to examine the impact of a firm’s governance characteristics on the signals released during the initial public offering (IPO) process. This paper focuses on the role of the firm’s founder and how different signals convey or diminish agency issues of adverse selection and moral hazard prior to IPO. This study also explores the performance impact (underpricing) of firm founder involvement on signal effectiveness.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper examines 122 firms during the IPO process to determine the influence that the founder’s presence, position and ownership has on signaling behaviors as well as on firm performance.

Findings

The authors find that founders influence how often the firm files amendments to the prospectus. Furthermore, the results suggest that agency-reducing signals are complicated and can interact to enhance either positive or negative signals that impact underpricing at IPO.

Research limitations/implications

The findings offer insights concerning how signalers can more effectively manage multiple signals that may interact negatively with firm characteristics. This study also provides contributions to both signaling and agency theories, discusses implications for practitioners and suggests opportunities for future research.

Practical implications

This has important implications for founders and managers of firms approaching IPO. The results suggest that founders are better off filing fewer addendums to their S-1 during the IPO process as this decreases underpricing. Underwriters and investors will be interested in these outcomes as identifying signals is an important factor when pricing firm valuation. Similarly, investors seek to identify firms that have a higher likelihood of underpricing because underpricing increases investor recognition and subsequent long-term impact on performance.

Originality/value

The findings offer insights concerning how signalers can more effectively manage multiple signals that may interact negatively with firm characteristics. The authors extend research in entrepreneurship and marketing by exploring indirect ways firms can communicate to investors using signaling, to increase value during the IPO process. This study provides contributions to both signaling and agency theories, discusses implications for practitioners and suggests opportunities for future research.

中文翻译：

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IPO过程中创始人信号的有效性和公司绩效

目的

本文旨在研究公司治理特征对首次公开募股 (IPO) 过程中释放的信号的影响。本文侧重于公司创始人的角色，以及不同的信号如何在 IPO 之前传达或减少逆向选择和道德风险的代理问题。本研究还探讨了公司创始人参与对信号有效性的绩效影响（抑价）。

设计/方法/途径

本文调查了 122 家公司在 IPO 过程中的情况，以确定创始人的存在、职位和所有权对信号行为以及公司绩效的影响。

发现

作者发现，创始人会影响公司提交招股说明书修正案的频率。此外，结果表明，减少机构的信号很复杂，并且可以相互作用以增强影响 IPO 抑价的正面或负面信号。

研究局限性/影响

这些发现提供了关于信号员如何更有效地管理可能与公司特征产生负面影响的多种信号的见解。这项研究还为信号和代理理论做出了贡献，讨论了对从业者的影响，并为未来的研究提出了机会。

实际影响

这对即将进行 IPO 的公司的创始人和经理具有重要意义。结果表明，创始人最好在 IPO 过程中提交较少的 S-1 附录，因为这会减少抑价。承销商和投资者将对这些结果感兴趣，因为识别信号是定价公司估值时的一个重要因素。类似地，投资者寻求确定抑价可能性较高的公司，因为抑价会增加投资者的认可度以及随后对业绩的长期影响。

原创性/价值

这些发现提供了关于信号员如何更有效地管理可能与公司特征产生负面影响的多种信号的见解。作者通过探索公司可以使用信号与投资者沟通的间接方式来扩展创业和营销方面的研究，以在 IPO 过程中增加价值。这项研究为信号和代理理论做出了贡献，讨论了对从业者的影响，并为未来的研究提出了机会。