ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the policy options available to governments for addressing the very costly economic impacts of cybersecurity threats. It contributes to complexity thinking in public policy. Complexity involves self-organization, emergence, feedback loops, and adaptation. We show that these are present with cyberthreats. In contrast to plans that involve a series of linear steps to a specific outcome, complexity thinking recommends adaptive design, which creates processes that involve coordinated decentralized capacity for experimentation and resilience. These are illustrated with an examination of the 2007 nation-wide cyberattack on Estonia and the lessons learned from this attack.

摘要

本文分析了政府可用于解决网络安全威胁造成的代价高昂的经济影响的政策选择。它有助于公共政策中的复杂性思维。复杂性涉及自组织、涌现、反馈循环和适应。我们表明这些存在网络威胁。与涉及到特定结果的一系列线性步骤的计划相反，复杂性思维建议适应性设计，它创建的流程涉及协调的分散实验能力和弹性。通过对 2007 年爱沙尼亚全国范围的网络攻击的审查以及从这次攻击中吸取的教训来说明这些问题。