Paragraph 50 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations famously says that there is one thing of which one can neither state that it is 1 m long nor that it isn't: the standard metre in Paris. Consensus appears to be that (1) exegetically speaking, Wittgenstein affirms this claim, and (2) systematically, whether or not one agrees with it, the practice of using a material artefact as a measurement standard has important philosophical consequences. In this paper, in contrast, we show that (1^') Wittgenstein does not affirm the standard metre claim and (2^') historical facts about material length standards do not warrant deeper philosophical conclusions. References to material measurement standards in the literature gravely distort the actual metrological practices of developing and using such standards.

中文翻译：

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维特根斯坦标准米的重量

维特根斯坦的《哲学研究》第 50 段有句名言，有一种东西既不能说它长 1 米也不能说不是：巴黎的标准米。共识似乎是：（1）从解经上讲，维特根斯坦肯定了这一主张，以及（2）系统地，无论人们是否同意，使用物质人工制品作为衡量标准的做法具有重要的哲学后果。相比之下，在这篇论文中，我们表明 (1 ^' ) 维特根斯坦没有肯定标准米的主张，并且 (2 ^') 关于材料长度标准的历史事实不能保证更深层次的哲学结论。文献中对材料测量标准的引用严重扭曲了开发和使用此类标准的实际计量实践。