This essays considers the hypothesis that Indian epistemology does not clearly recognize, let alone emphasize, an intellectual faculty that apprehends intelligible things, such as essences or “truths of reason,” or elevate knowledge of such things to a status higher than that of sense perception. Evidence for this hypothesis from various sources, including Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and Buddhist logic-epistemological writings, is examined. Special attention is given to a passage from Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika, Pratyakṣasūtra chapter, where he argues that the senses directly perceive existence. Kumārila’s view is contrasted to Plato’s, in the Theaetetus, that existence is the object, not of the senses, but the soul (psychē).

这篇文章考虑了这样一种假设，即印度认识​​论并没有清楚地承认，更不用说强调，一种理解可理解事物的智力能力，例如本质或“理性的真理”，或者将这些事物的知识提升到高于感官知觉的地位。 . 研究了来自各种来源的这一假设的证据，包括 Sāṃkhya、Yoga、Nyāya 和佛教逻辑认识论著作。特别关注 Kumārila 的Ślokavarttika，Pratyakṣasūtra章节中的一段，他认为感官直接感知存在。Kumārila 的观点与柏拉图的观点形成对比，在Theaetetus中，存在是对象，不是感官的对象，而是灵魂 ( psychē )。