ABSTRACT

Parliamentary Monitoring Organisations [PMOs] seek to make legislators more accountable and reduce the potential moral hazards of delegation. This study of the UK finds that PMOs do reduce such hazards and make for greater ‘informatory’ accountability from MPs and Peers. The primary effect is on the House of Commons, and on individual MPs, where information seeking is most frequently local. The exact impact is variable, and depends on whether a Member is in government or opposition, how long they have served and, more subtly, whether they are male or female. The impact of PMOs is uneven, and can provoke resistance and gaming or fuel political conflict.

摘要

议会监督组织 [PMO] 力求让立法者更加负责并减少授权的潜在道德风险。这项针对英国的研究发现，PMO 确实减少了此类危害，并为国会议员和同行提供了更大的“信息”责任。主要影响是对下议院和个别议员的影响，在这些地方寻求信息的频率最高的是本地的。确切的影响是可变的，取决于成员是政府还是反对党，他们服务了多长时间，更微妙的是，他们是男性还是女性。PMO 的影响是不平衡的，可能会引发抵制和博弈或助长政治冲突。