The rich literature on Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG)-type pensions provides a notion that when pension return is dominated by the market return, generally it is impossible to phase pension out without hurting any generation. We show that PAYG pensions can indeed be phased out in a much richer framework where fertility is endogenous and general equilibrium effects are present. Interestingly, the factor that helps us to phase the pension out in a Pareto way is hidden in the structure of PAYG pension itself. Individualistic agents fail to recognize the benefits of their fertility decision on these programs and, therefore, end up in an allocation that is strictly dominated by the allocations that internalize this externality. Exploiting this positive externality, competitive economy can improve its allocations and can reach the planner's steady-state in finite time where each generation secures as much utility as in the competitive equilibrium. Clearly, it is possible to transition in a Pareto way to an economy either with no pension or with pensions whose return is not dominated by market return.

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一般均衡中的养老金、可能的淘汰和内生生育率

关于现收现付 (PAYG) 型养老金的丰富文献提供了一种观念，即当养老金回报由市场回报主导时，通常不可能在不伤害任何一代人的情况下逐步淘汰养老金。我们表明，现收现付养老金确实可以在生育率是内生的且存在一般均衡效应的更丰富的框架中逐步淘汰。有趣的是，帮助我们以帕累托方式逐步淘汰养老金的因素隐藏在现收现付养老金本身的结构中。个人主义代理人未能认识到他们的生育决定对这些计划的好处，因此最终导致分配严格受内部化这种外部性的分配支配。利用这种正外部性，竞争性经济可以改善其配置并达到计划者的要求 s 在有限时间内处于稳定状态，每一代人都获得与竞争均衡中一样多的效用。显然，有可能以帕累托方式过渡到没有养老金或养老金回报不受市场回报支配的经济体。