Abstract

Most analytical philosophers consider that we cannot identify with fictional characters in a literal sense. Specifically, Carroll and Gaut argue that doing so would imply a high degree of irrationality. In this paper I stand for the claim that we can identify with fictional characters thanks to a suspension of disbelief. First, I rely on narrative theories of personal identity to propose a model of how the process of identification might happen in real life. Then, I explain how this model can be adapted to account for the suspension of disbelief that occurs in the special case of identification with fictional characters.

中文翻译：

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有时我是虚构的：叙事与认同

摘要

大多数分析哲学家认为，我们无法从字面意义上认同虚构人物。具体而言，卡罗尔和高特认为，这样做意味着高度的非理性。在这篇论文中，我主张我们可以通过暂停怀疑来认同虚构人物。首先，我依靠个人身份的叙事理论提出了一个模型，说明身份识别过程在现实生活中如何发生。然后，我解释了如何调整该模型来解释在认同虚构人物的特殊情况下发生的怀疑悬置。