This paper analyzes the optimal commodity tax policy, in a generalized vertical differentiation model in which consumers have positional considerations. Consumers enjoy having a product which is better than that owned by others, and feel envy when others own a better product than them. We examine the impact of these positional considerations on the optimal tax and welfare when a monopoly produces two variants of such good. The standard result that the government should subsidize the product, can be reversed in our setting. In the presence of positional concerns, the optimal tax rate can be positive. Furthermore, the positional effects determine the level of the tax pass-through on prices. Finally, the tax levied on the high-quality variant affects the price of the low-quality variant and vice versa.

中文翻译：

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考虑位置因素的最优税收

本文在消费者具有位置考虑因素的广义垂直差异化模型中分析了最优商品税收政策。消费者喜欢拥有比别人拥有的更好的产品，并且当别人拥有比他们更好的产品时感到嫉妒。当垄断生产此类商品的两种变体时，我们研究了这些位置考虑因素对最优税收和福利的影响。政府应该补贴产品的标准结果，可以在我们的设置中反转。在存在位置问题的情况下，最优税率可以为正。此外，位置效应决定了税收对价格的转嫁水平。最后，对高质量变体征收的税会影响低质量变体的价格，反之亦然。