This paper introduces a pre-election polling stage to Feddersen and Pesendorfer's two-candidate election model in which some voters are uncertain about the state of the world. While Feddersen and Pesendorfer find that less informed, indifferent voters strictly prefer abstention, which they refer to as the swing voter's curse, I show that there exists an equilibrium in which everyone truthfully reveals his or her preference in the pre-election poll and participates in voting. Moreover, even in the truth-telling equilibrium, the candidate who leads in the poll may lose the election. However, polls can help elections aggregate information more successfully.

中文翻译：

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选前民意调查的信息作用

本文介绍了 Feddersen 和 Pesendorfer 的双候选人选举模型的选举前投票阶段，其中一些选民不确定世界状况。虽然 Feddersen 和 Pesendorfer 发现消息灵通、冷漠的选民更喜欢弃权，他们称之为摇摆不定的选民的诅咒，但我表明存在一种均衡，在这种均衡中，每个人都在选举前的民意调查中如实表明自己的偏好，并参与投票。表决。而且，即使在说真话的均衡中，民调领先的候选人也有可能落选。但是，民意调查可以帮助选举更成功地汇总信息。