In this study, the endogenous timing of moves is analyzed in an infinitely repeated game setting of capital tax competition between a subgroup (a tax union) of countries agreeing on partial tax harmonization and outside countries. It is shown that in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated tax competition game, they simultaneously set capital taxes in every stage game when a tax union comprises similar countries with respect to productivity, whereas they may set capital taxes sequentially in every stage game when a tax union comprises dissimilar countries. This finding is significantly different from Ogawa (2013), although we also assume that capital is owned by the country's residents, as in Ogawa's model. This is because a disadvantaged member country of the tax union would suffer from larger losses when a tax union comprising dissimilar countries, and thus the tax union will choose the strategy of moving Late for the sake of sustaining tax harmonization to avoid such losses.

中文翻译：

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税收竞争的重复互动模型中的内生领导和加强合作的可持续性：税收竞争中的内生领导

在这项研究中，在一个无限重复的资本税竞争博弈环境中，在同意部分税收协调的国家（税收联盟）与外部国家之间进行资本税竞争的内生时机分析。研究表明，在无限重复税收竞争博弈的子博弈完美均衡中，当税收联盟由生产率相似的国家组成时，他们在每个阶段博弈中同时设定资本税，而当税收联盟由生产率相似的国家组成时，他们可能在每个阶段博弈中按顺序设定资本税。一个税收联盟由不同的国家组成。这一发现与 Ogawa (2013) 显着不同，尽管我们也假设资本由该国居民所有，就像在小川的模型中一样。这是因为当税收联盟由不同的国家组成时，税收联盟的弱势成员国将遭受更大的损失，因此税收联盟会为了维持税收协调而选择迟到的策略来避免这种损失。