We study experimentally cooperation in group contests under a new sharing rule that captures elements of coopetitive setups that are often characterized by the tension between cooperation and competition. It introduces an allocation of the obtained prize which is inversely proportional to individual efforts. We use it to study if the pervasive over-expenditure observed in group contests remains even when individual effort is extremely disincentivized and compare its effects with the egalitarian sharing rule. Participants in our experiment make more effort with the egalitarian than with the inverse proportional rule, but we document a sizeable over-expenditure even with the inverse proportional rule. We find that contribution in a public goods game is positively associated with effort in the group contest. Social value orientation, risk attitudes, competitiveness, or other personality traits do not predict behavior consistently.

我们在新的共享规则下通过实验研究小组竞赛中的合作，该规则捕获了通常以合作与竞争之间的紧张关系为特征的竞争设置元素。它引入了与个人努力成反比的分配获得的奖金。我们用它来研究在集体竞赛中观察到的普遍超支是否仍然存在，即使个人努力受到极大抑制，并将其效果与平等分享规则进行比较。在我们的实验中，参与者在平均主义方面比在反比例规则下付出更多的努力，但我们记录了即使在反比例规则下也有相当大的超支。我们发现公共物品游戏中的贡献与团体竞赛中的努力正相关。社会价值取向、风险态度、