In the last twenty years a large number of ethanol firms have established operations in the US. Ethanol, produced from corn, is blended with pure gasoline to produce fuel. Producers hold an option to turn off unprofitable plants. Blenders choose to substitute ethanol for gasoline at or beyond the mandate set by the government. We propose an equilibrium model for blenders and producers that accounts for government measures and for real optionality embedded in the industry. The model, driven by corn and gasoline prices, leads to analytical expressions for the price and output of ethanol, and to policy implications on the impacts of the mandate and blend credit. The model also leads to closed form valuation for an ethanol producer. Using data between 2000 and 2017 we confirm that, as in the model, ethanol was largely priced as the maximum of rescaled gasoline and corn prices. Historical output levels between the mandate and installed capacity were explained by our theory. Finally, the share price dynamics for the largest public ethanol producer in the US was consistent in some aspects with the value of a real option.

在过去的二十年里，大量乙醇公司在美国建立了业务。由玉米生产的乙醇与纯汽油混合来生产燃料。生产商可以选择关闭无利可图的工厂。调配商选择在政府规定的范围内或超出政府规定的范围内替代汽油。我们为搅拌机和生产商提出了一个均衡模型，该模型考虑了政府措施和行业内的真实选择性。该模型由玉米和汽油价格驱动，得出乙醇价格和产量的分析表达式，以及对任务和混合信贷影响的政策影响。该模型还可以对乙醇生产商进行封闭式估值。使用 2000 年至 2017 年之间的数据，我们确认，正如模型中一样，乙醇的定价很大程度上是汽油和玉米价格重新调整后的最高价格。我们的理论解释了任务和装机容量之间的历史产量水平。最后，美国最大的公共乙醇生产商的股价动态在某些方面与实物期权的价值一致。