Abstract

How do central bankers cope with the uncomfortable fact that there are significant limits to their expertise without losing authority? Drawing on Steve Rayner’s concept of ‘uncomfortable knowledge’, this paper undertakes a historical examination of the early years of Paul Volcker’s role at the head of the Federal Reserve, and then traces the ways in which the uncomfortable fact of ignorance has been dealt with in the years since then: from the reflexive and experimental approach of the 1980s, through the dismissal and displacement of the Great Moderation, to the exceptionalism and new experimentalism of the post-2008 era. In each of these eras, I argue that central banks face a visibility dilemma: their expertise must be visible enough to demonstrate their mastery but not so conspicuous that the often ad hoc and uncertain nature of their craft generates political push-back about their role and authority.

摘要

央行行长如何在不失去权威的情况下应对其专业知识受到重大限制这一令人不安的事实？本文借鉴史蒂夫·雷纳 (Steve Rayner) 的“令人不安的知识”概念，对保罗·沃尔克 (Paul Volcker) 早年担任美联储主席的角色进行了历史考察，然后追溯了美国处理令人不安的无知事实的方式。从那以后的岁月：从 1980 年代的反思性和实验性方法，到大温和的解雇和取代，到 2008 年后时代的例外主义和新实验主义。在每个时代，我认为中央银行都面临着一个可见性困境：它们的专业知识必须足够可见，以证明它们的精通，但又不能太显眼，以至于经常临时性的他们手艺的不确定性导致了对其角色和权威的政​​治抵制。