Abstract

We analyse the trajectory of independence in the formation of the European Central Bank (ECB), conceptualized as a boundary organization that, by delineating the European economy, contributes to a supranational state effect. Success in the effort, however, requires the ECB to constantly assert a separate and special status, despite its embeddedness in multiple fields. Focusing on the European Monetary Institute, the ECB’s predecessor, we trace how historically obscure bank-based legal experts enabled the ECB’s assertion of separateness by reworking independence into a newly multivalent category that could be wielded in authority struggles with national central banks and European institutions. The ECB’s dependence on independence, we argue, renders it uniquely vulnerable to the repoliticization of central banking.

摘要

我们分析了欧洲中央银行 (ECB) 形成过程中的独立性轨迹，该银行被概念化为一个边界组织，通过描绘欧洲经济，有助于产生超国家的国家效应。然而，这项努力的成功需要欧洲央行不断主张独立和特殊的地位，尽管它嵌入多个领域。以欧洲货币研究所（欧洲央行的前身）为重点，我们追溯了历史上默默无闻的银行法律专家如何通过将独立性改造成一个新的多价类别来实现欧洲央行的独立性主张，该类别可以在与各国中央银行和欧洲机构的权威斗争中发挥作用。我们认为，欧洲央行对独立性的依赖使其特别容易受到中央银行重新政治化的影响。