Abstract

The present article challenges a widespread view of blame as an inherently moral attitude. I begin by pointing out some features of blame that are not readily explained by, and not obviously compatible with, a moral orientation. To account for those features, I elucidate Nietzsche’s insights that blame responds to frustration and can serve as a bulwark against unwelcome self-perception, drawing as well on modern psychoanalysis’s inheritance of those insights. In the second half of the paper, I critically examine three of the most thorough attempts to root blame in moral foundations, those of George Sher, T.M. Scanlon and Miranda Fricker. I argue that each of these authors overestimates the prevalence and centrality of the influence morality can have on blame, to conclude that blame and morality only dovetail contingently some of the time.

摘要

本文挑战了一种普遍的观点，即指责是一种固有的道德态度。首先，我指出责备的一些特征，这些特征很难用道德取向来解释，也与道德取向显然不相容。为了解释这些特征，我阐明了尼采的见解，即责备是对挫折的反应，可以作为抵御不受欢迎的自我认知的堡垒，同时借鉴了现代精神分析对这些见解的继承。在本文的后半部分，我批判性地审视了乔治·谢尔（George Sher）、TM·斯坎伦（TM Scanlon）和米兰达·弗里克（Miranda Fricker）这三位最彻底地将责任归咎于道德基础的尝试。我认为，这些作者都高估了道德对责备的影响的普遍性和中心性，从而得出结论：责备和道德只是在某些时候偶然地吻合。