Philosophical discussions of free speech often focus on moral considerations such as the harm that certain forms of expression might cause. However, in addition to our moral obligations, we also have a distinct set of epistemic obligations—and even when a false belief doesn't harm anyone, it constitutes an epistemically bad outcome. Moreover, the existing psychological evidence suggests that human beings are vulnerable to the influence of a wide variety of false claims via a wide variety of psychological mechanisms. Taken together, these facts suggest that there is a purely epistemic justification for restricting the distribution of misinformation: Because each of us has an individual epistemic obligation to avoid unnecessary exposure to misinformation, and because avoiding such exposure is simply too difficult when acting alone, we all have a shared epistemic obligation to establish laws or regulations restricting the widespread distribution of misinformation.

中文翻译：

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认知义务和言论自由

关于言论自由的哲学讨论通常集中在道德考虑上，例如某些表达形式可能造成的伤害。然而，除了我们的道德义务之外，我们还有一套独特的认知义务——即使错误的信念不会伤害任何人，它也构成了认知上的坏结果。此外，现有的心理学证据表明，人类容易受到各种心理机制的各种虚假主张的影响。综上所述，这些事实表明，限制错误信息的传播有一个纯粹的认知理由：因为我们每个人都有避免不必要地暴露于错误信息的个人认知义务，而且因为单独行动时避免这种暴露太难了，我们所有人都有共同的认知义务，即制定限制错误信息广泛传播的法律或法规。