During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments at every level in the United States made various policies to reduce the spread of the disease and to mitigate pandemic-related economic impacts. Such policies included stay-at-home orders that shuttered “non-essential” businesses and economic stimulus programs that provided financial assistance. Using Israel Kirzner’s insights from “The Perils of Regulation,” we argue that local, state, and federal COVID-19 policies have had and will continue to have long-run spillover effects and other negative unintended consequences. Pandemic policies have stifled entrepreneurial discovery and created opportunities for superfluous discovery, thus directing entrepreneurial efforts in directions that would not have existed otherwise. The normative implications of this analysis are that policymakers should better account for the wide variety of seen and unseen costs of policies that are likely to have many negative unintended consequences, regardless of the intentions behind such policies. One of the most effective ways to limit the perils of regulation is polycentric governance systems. With multiple, overlapping decision-making centers, polycentric systems allow for policymakers to experiment with different policy approaches and learn from other jurisdictions. Polycentric systems also limit the spillover effects of negative unintended consequences onto other jurisdictions.

在 COVID-19 大流行期间，美国各级政府制定了各种政策来减少疾病的传播并减轻与大流行相关的经济影响。此类政策包括关闭“非必要”业务的居家令和提供财政援助的经济刺激计划。利用 Israel Kirzner 在“监管的危险”中的见解，我们认为地方、州和联邦的 COVID-19 政策已经并将继续产生长期的溢出效应和其他意外的负面后果。大流行病政策扼杀了创业发现，并为多余的发现创造了机会，从而将创业努力导向了原本不会存在的方向。该分析的规范含义是政策制定者应更好地考虑政策的各种可见和不可见成本，这些成本可能会产生许多负面的意外后果，无论这些政策背后的意图如何。限制监管风险的最有效方法之一是多中心治理体系。通过多个重叠的决策中心，多中心系统允许政策制定者尝试不同的政策方法并向其他司法管辖区学习。多中心系统还限制了负面意外后果对其他司法管辖区的溢出效应。限制监管风险的最有效方法之一是多中心治理体系。通过多个重叠的决策中心，多中心系统允许政策制定者尝试不同的政策方法并向其他司法管辖区学习。多中心系统还限制了负面意外后果对其他司法管辖区的溢出效应。限制监管风险的最有效方法之一是多中心治理体系。通过多个重叠的决策中心，多中心系统允许政策制定者尝试不同的政策方法并向其他司法管辖区学习。多中心系统还限制了负面意外后果对其他司法管辖区的溢出效应。