This essay is a close examination of one of Nahman of Bratslav's early and largely unexamined texts, Sefer ha-Middot. The question it addresses is whether one can call this a study of “ethics” or, in Jewish nomenclature, musar, a work that seeks to cultivate human behaviors and describe ethical formation. In addition, it asks whether Sefer ha-Middot can be called a text of “virtue ethics” given its focus on virtues and their enactment. The essay argues that Nahman's peculiar metaphysical notion that all mitzvot are inextricably intertwined prevents any analysis of behavioral causality severing his “ethics” from any Aristotelian or Kantian tradition and brings him closer to Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of ethics as tied to traditional norms. And even with MacIntyre, the comparison is quite limited. Discussing “faith,” the “zaddik,” and “money,” the essay explores Nahman's view of how these and other virtues are cultivated and achieved.

中文翻译：

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看不见的后果的伦理学：布拉茨拉夫的 Sefer Ha-Middot 的 Rabbi Nahman

这篇文章是对 Bratslav 的 Nahman 早期和大部分未经审查的文本之一的仔细审查，Sefer ha-Middot。它解决的问题是，是否可以将其称为“伦理学”研究，或者用犹太人的术语来说，musar是一部旨在培养人类行为和描述伦理形成的著作。此外，它询问Sefer ha-Middot鉴于其对美德及其实施的关注，它可以被称为“美德伦理学”的文本。这篇文章认为，纳曼独特的形而上学观念认为所有的戒律都密不可分地交织在一起，这阻止了任何对行为因果关系的分析将他的“伦理学”与任何亚里士多德或康德传统割裂开来，并使他更接近阿拉斯代尔麦金太尔的与传统规范相关的伦理学概念。即使与 MacIntyre 相比，这种比较也非常有限。这篇文章讨论了“信仰”、“ zaddik ”和“金钱”，探讨了纳赫曼关于如何培养和实现这些美德和其他美德的观点。