We study the impact of environmental regulation on the transfer of a clean technology where bureaucrats are needed for government intervention. In the absence of corruption, when environmental taxes are low, a technology transfer always takes place and it increases total outputs, but may lead to higher pollution levels. However, when corruption is possible, a firm with a dirty technology may choose to bribe a corruptible bureaucrat who will underreport the actual level of emissions, thereby hindering the transfer of clean technology. We show that a less strict anticorruption policy may lead to more bribing, but encourage technology transfers. Moreover, an environment-oriented government would set a deterrent environmental tax to reduce pollution, while an output-oriented government would set a minimum tax rate to eliminate corruption and induce technology transfers. However, a balanced government would tolerate corruption when the cost of bribing is low and the clean technology is sufficiently efficient.

中文翻译：

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腐败会鼓励清洁技术转让吗？

我们研究了环境法规对需要官僚进行政府干预的清洁技术转让的影响。在没有腐败的情况下，当环境税很低时，技术转让总是会发生，它会增加总产出，但可能会导致更高的污染水平。然而，当腐败成为可能时，拥有肮脏技术的公司可能会选择贿赂腐败的官僚，后者将低报实际排放水平，从而阻碍清洁技术的转让。我们表明，不太严格的反腐败政策可能会导致更多的贿赂，但会鼓励技术转让。此外，以环境为导向的政府将设置具有威慑力的环境税以减少污染，而一个以产出为导向的政府将设定最低税率以消除腐败并促进技术转让。然而，当贿赂成本低且清洁技术足够有效时，平衡的政府会容忍腐败。