According to the Welfare Diffusion Objection, we should reject Prioritarianism because it implies the ‘desirability of welfare diffusion’: the claim that it can be better for there to be less total wellbeing spread thinly between a larger total number of people, rather than for there to be more total wellbeing, spread more generously between a smaller total number of people. I argue that while Prioritarianism does not directly imply the desirability of welfare diffusion, Prioritarians are nevertheless implicitly committed to certain principles for comparing different-number populations which, together with the Prioritarian same-person axiology, imply the desirability of welfare diffusion.

根据福利扩散反对，我们应该拒绝优先主义，因为它暗示了“福利扩散的可取性”：主张将较少的总体福利分散在更多的人之间，而不是在更多的人之间分配，这样会更好。为了获得更全面的福祉，请在更少的人群中更慷慨地传播。我认为，虽然优先主义并不直接暗示福利扩散的可取性，但优先主义仍然隐含地致力于比较不同数量人口的某些原则，这些原则与优先主义的同一人价值论一起暗示了福利扩散的可取性。