ABSTRACT

This essay uses concepts from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments to develop ideas about choice and welfare. I use those ideas to offer several challenges to common approaches to behavioral welfare economics and new paternalist policy making. Drawing on Smith’s dialectical concept of practical reason, which he develops in expositing ideas about self-awareness and self-judgment, I first argue that inconsistency need not be viewed as pathological. Inconsistent choices might indicate legitimate context-dependencies as individuals reflect over disjointed perspectives and act accordingly. Understanding inconsistency as reasonable raises epistemic difficulties for identifying errant choices and designing corrective policies. Second, I draw on Smith’s theory of the impartial spectator to discuss dynamic aspects of welfare. Welfare is not simply a matter of preference satisfaction but involves a sense of progress and improvement towards better preferences. Smith’s account suggests that economists interested in welfare should focus on institutional arrangements that facilitate self-development.

摘要

这篇文章使用了亚当斯密的道德情操理论中的概念发展关于选择和福利的想法。我使用这些想法对行为福利经济学和新家长式政策制定的常用方法提出了一些挑战。借鉴史密斯在阐述自我意识和自我判断的思想时发展的实践理性的辩证概念，我首先论证不一致不必被视为病态。不一致的选择可能表明合法的上下文依赖性，因为个人会反思脱节的观点并采取相应的行动。将不一致理解为合理会增加识别错误选择和设计纠正政策的认知困难。其次，我利用史密斯的公正旁观者理论来讨论福利的动态方面。福利不仅仅是偏好满足的问题，还涉及朝着更好的偏好进步和改进的感觉。斯密的解释表明，对福利感兴趣的经济学家应该关注促进自我发展的制度安排。