An increase in the number of local jurisdictions providing industrial public goods may lead to a rise in the equilibrium tax rate, in contrast to the case of residential public goods. When local jurisdictions are Leviathans, an increase in competition may expand tax revenues and thus fail to tame the Leviathan, contrary to the conventional wisdom.

中文翻译：

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税收竞争、公众投入和市场力量

与住宅公共产品的情况相反，提供工业公共产品的地方管辖区数量的增加可能会导致均衡税率的上升。当地方司法管辖区成为利维坦时，竞争的增加可能会增加税收收入，从而无法驯服利维坦，这与传统智慧相反。