In this paper, I argue for a pragmatic theory of the motivations behind the practice of defining concepts in philosophy. The “correct” definition in philosophy is not, as is usually supposed, the definition that accurately describes some pre-philosophical meaning, but the definition which is useful for the achievement of certain theoretical goals. I consider different examples of definitional debates from the history of philosophy. The analysis of these examples also evidences why philosophers do not usually grant the incidence of pragmatic reason in their conceptual investigations. At the end of the paper, I provide some reasons that explain why the incidence of pragmatic reasons is inevitable.

中文翻译：

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哲学定义：一种务实的方法

在本文中，我主张在哲学中定义概念的实践背后的动机的实用主义理论。哲学中的“正确”定义，并不是通常所设想的那样，是准确描述某些前哲学意义的定义，而是对实现某些理论目标有用的定义。我考虑了哲学史上定义辩论的不同例子。对这些例子的分析也证明了为什么哲学家在他们的概念研究中通常不承认实用理性的发生。在本文的最后，我提供了一些原因来解释为什么实用原因的发生是不可避免的。