This essay accomplishes two goals. First, I explore Husserl’s study of “tension” from his 1893 manuscript, “Notes Towards a Theory of Attention and Interest,” to reveal that it comprises his de facto first analysis of instinct. Husserl there describes tension as the innate pull to execute ever new objectifications. He clarifies this pull of objectification by contrasting it to affective and volitional experiences. This analysis surprisingly prefigures a theory of drive-feelings and anticipates the idea that consciousness is both teleological and autotelic. Second, I show how Husserl’s de facto account of instincts from 1893 inspires his robust philosophy of instincts from Studies concerning the Structures of Consciousness and other late manuscripts. While Husserl maintains many 1893 insights, he now claims that the instinct towards objectification comprises affective and volitional moments. Finally, I demonstrate that Husserl’s analyses of instincts throughout his life are united by the idea that consciousness possesses an essential structural lack.

这篇文章实现了两个目标。首先，我从胡塞尔 1893 年的手稿“注意力和兴趣理论注释”中探索了胡塞尔对“张力”的研究，以揭示它实际上包含了他对本能的第一个分析。胡塞尔在那里将紧张描述为执行新的对象化的内在拉力。他通过将其与情感和意志体验进行对比来阐明这种客体化的吸引力。这种分析出人意料地预示了一种驱力感受理论，并预见了意识既是目的论又是自我实现的观点。其次，我展示了胡塞尔从 1893 年开始对本能的事实上的解释是如何从关于意识结构的研究中激发他强大的本能哲学的和其他晚期手稿。虽然胡塞尔保留了许多 1893 年的见解，但他现在声称对象化的本能包括情感和意志时刻。最后，我证明了胡塞尔一生对本能的分析都与意识具有本质的结构缺失这一观点相结合。