Disguised disciplinary sanctions are methods used by public administrators or decision-makers to punish a public servant despite the latter not having violated regulations or laws. Instead, such punishment is motivated by personal resentments. The administration may impose arbitrary decisions on their employees while claiming that said decisions serve the public interest, hiding their true intentions. This study employs a descriptive-analytical method to shed light on the position of the Jordanian and French administrative judicial authorities on disguised disciplinary sanctions. The study considers and compares the relevant laws and jurisprudence of judicial authorities in Jordan and France; it further determines the role of these authorities in revealing disguised sanctions absent a specified list of disciplinary violations in the Civil Service Regulations in both jurisdictions.

中文翻译：

---

约旦和法国法律中的变相纪律处分和公共服务

变相纪律处分是公共行政人员或决策者在公务员没有违反法律法规的情况下，对公务员采取的惩戒手段。相反，这种惩罚是出于个人怨恨。行政部门可能会对他们的员工强加任意决定，同时声称这些决定符合公共利益，隐藏他们的真实意图。本研究采用描述性分析的方法来阐明约旦和法国行政司法当局在变相纪律处分方面的立场。该研究考虑并比较了约旦和法国司法当局的相关法律和判例；