This essay defends the moral permissibility, as a form of punishment, of banishment, namely the exclusion by a state of a citizen from its territory. I begin by outlining the prima facie case for banishment, consider for whom it may be appropriate, and acknowledge constraints on its permissibility. I then defend banishment against the main objections in the literature to banishment or the related measure of denationalization (stripping citizens of their citizenship): impermissible permanency; excessive severity; ineffectiveness; unfairness to those who are punished and the creation of two classes of citizens; unfairness among states; and that banishment without denationalization is incompatible with the nature of citizenship. I adopt a ‘cantilever strategy’: if incarceration is permissible notwithstanding a certain objection, so is banishment. In concluding, I sympathetically discuss the view that, despite the moral permissibility of banishment, the power to banish should not be instituted because of the risk of abuse.

这篇文章捍卫了作为一种惩罚形式的放逐的道德许可，即国家将公民排除在其领土之外。我首先概述流放的初步证据，考虑它可能适合谁，并承认对其允许性的限制。然后，我为流放辩护反对文献中对流放或相关的剥夺国籍措施（剥夺公民的公民身份）的主要反对意见：不允许的永久性；过分严重; 无效；对受到惩罚的人不公平，并造成两类公民；国家之间的不公平；没有取消国籍的放逐与公民的性质不相容。我采用了一种“悬臂式策略”：如果尽管有人反对，但监禁是允许的，那么放逐也是如此。