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LAW AND MORALITY IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Legal Theory Pub Date : 2022-12-06 , DOI: 10.1017/s1352325222000180
Linda Eggert

This paper examines what prevents us from legally enforcing the moral imperative of protecting human rights during military operations carried out for distinctly humanitarian purposes. The answer, I argue, lies not in familiar objections to bringing the law into greater congruence with morality, but in international law's indeterminacy regarding the use of force. Preserving stability within the nascent international legal system comes at the cost of a law that eschews the protection of individual rights even in cases in which the protection of human rights is what justifies military action. The tension between state sovereignty and the protection of human rights thus not only generates well-known controversies about the lawfulness of military intervention. It also prevents us from devising laws to protect human rights during wars whose very purpose it is to stop human rights violations. Protecting human rights during humanitarian interventions may thus remain an undertaking as quixotic as it is morally urgent.

中文翻译:

人道主义干预中的法律和道德

本文探讨了是什么阻碍了我们在出于明确的人道主义目的而开展的军事行动中依法执行保护人权的道德义务。我认为,答案不在于对使法律与道德更加一致的常见反对意见,而在于国际法在使用武力方面的不确定性。在新生的国际法律体系内保持稳定是以法律为代价的,该法律回避保护个人权利,即使在保护人权是军事行动正当理由的情况下也是如此。因此,国家主权与保护人权之间的紧张关系不仅引发了关于军事干预合法性的众所周知的争论。它还阻止我们制定法律以在战争期间保护人权,而其目的正是为了制止侵犯人权行为。因此,在人道主义干预期间保护人权可能仍然是一项不切实际的任务,因为它在道义上是紧迫的。
更新日期:2022-12-06
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