This paper studies the conditions under which rewarding compliant taxpayers is an optimal mechanism to improve tax collection. The theoretical model suggests that when auditing contributors and evading are both costly, rewarding tax compliance is an effective strategy to increase the government’s profit. I provide empirical evidence from the Argentinian provinces’ rewards and tax policy variation. Where the data suggest that theoretical conditions hold, there is a positive effect in the real estate per-capita tax collection ranging from 0.4 to more than 2 standard deviations. This result has important policy implications, mapping the private evasion cost and the price of traditional policy tools as the main determinants of positive incentives’ effectiveness.

本文研究了在什么情况下奖励合规纳税人是改善税收的最佳机制。理论模型表明，当审计贡献者和逃税者都需要成本时，奖励税收遵从是增加政府利润的有效策略。我提供了来自阿根廷各省奖励和税收政策变化的实证证据。在数据表明理论条件成立的情况下，房地产人均税收征收的积极影响在 0.4 到超过 2 个标准差之间。这一结果具有重要的政策意义，将私人逃税成本和传统政策工具的价格映射为积极激励措施有效性的主要决定因素。