We look into technology transfer by an insider patentee in a spatial duopoly model under three types of licensing contracts—(i) two-part tariff with fixed fee and per-unit royalty, (ii) two-part tariff with fixed fee and ad-valorem royalty and (iii) general three-part tariff with fixed fee, per-unit and ad-valorem royalties. Under two-part tariff contracts, the licenser is better off with the per-unit royalty contract but the general contract does better than the other contracts. In contrast to the existing literature, all three licensing contracts may make the consumers worse-off compared to no licensing, with the lowest consumer surplus achieved under the general licensing contract. Welfare under the general licensing contract is equal to the welfare under two-part tariff with ad-valorem royalty and it is higher than the welfare under no licensing but lower than the welfare under two-part tariff with per-unit royalty. Hence, the general three-part licensing contract is privately optimal but not socially optimal. Similar conclusions hold also under a nonspatial linear demand model with differentiated products.

中文翻译：

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最佳专利许可——二部或三部关税

我们研究了在三种类型的许可合同下，内部专利权人在空间双头垄断模式下的技术转让——(i) 固定费用和每单位特许权使用费的两部制关税，(ii) 固定费用和广告的两部制关税从价特许权使用费和 (iii) 一般三部分关税，包括固定费用、按单位和从价特许权使用费。在两部制关税合同下，许可人使用按单位使用费合同的情况会更好，但总合同比其他合同要好。与现有文献相比，与没有许可相比，所有三种许可合同都可能使消费者的处境更糟，一般许可合同下实现的消费者剩余最低。一般许可合同下的福利等于从价特许权使用费两部制下的福利，高于无许可下的福利，但低于从价两部制特许权使用费下的福利。因此，一般的三部分许可合同是私人最优的，但不是社会最优的。类似的结论在具有差异化产品的非空间线性需求模型下也成立。