This essay situates Alasdair MacIntyre's typology of moral enquiry in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry relative to his critique of Søren Kierkegaard in After Virtue to offer an alternative reading of Kierkegaard's Either/Or to the one MacIntyre proposes. The essay shows that MacIntyre's reading of Kierkegaard's Either/Or fails to register that in important respects Kierkegaard's counterpoint of rival perspectives in Either/Or bears striking resemblance to the scenario of mutual antagonisms that MacIntyre identifies among the genres of genealogy, encyclopaedia, and tradition-informed moral enquiry. The essay then proposes a reading of Either/Or that implicitly questions not just the approach of the encyclopaedists, but also the approach of all genealogists of modernity (including the genealogy of Friedrich Nietzsche). Finally, contrary to MacIntyre's unfortunate judgement that “Kierkegaard's doctrine” is “at once the outcome and the epitaph of the Enlightenment's systematic attempt to discover a rational justification for morality,” the essay argues instead that what we can learn from Kierkegaard has been and ought to remain of enduring relevance for “tradition-informed” philosophical and theological thinking in modernity.

中文翻译：

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要么（尼采）/要么（亚里士多德）？麦金泰尔的现代性和克尔凯郭尔的持久相关性

本文将阿拉斯代尔·麦金泰尔在《道德探究的三个竞争版本》中的道德探究类型学与他在《美德之后》中对索伦·克尔凯郭尔的批评进行对比，以提供对克尔凯郭尔的“非此即彼”的另一种解读，而不是麦金泰尔提出的解读。这篇文章表明，麦金泰尔对克尔凯郭尔的《非此即彼》的解读未能注意到，在重要方面，克尔凯郭尔在《非此即彼》中对立观点的对立与麦金泰尔在谱系学、百科全书和传统流派中所识别的相互对抗的场景有着惊人的相似之处——知情的道德调查。然后这篇文章建议阅读“非此即彼”这不仅隐含地质疑了百科全书学家的方法，而且也质疑了所有现代性谱系学家（包括弗里德里希·尼采的谱系学）的方法。最后，与麦金泰尔的不幸判断相反，他认为“克尔凯郭尔的学说”是“启蒙运动系统性尝试发现道德合理性的结果和墓志铭”，本文认为，我们可以从克尔凯郭尔身上学到的东西已经而且应该是对现代性中“传统的”哲学和神学思维保持持久的相关性。