We introduce possibilistic beliefs into strategic games, describing a player’s belief about his opponents’ strategies as the set of their strategies he regards as possible. We formulate possibilistic strategic games where each player has preferences over his own strategies conditional on his possibilistic belief about his opponents’ strategies. We define several solution concepts for possibilistic strategic games such as (strict) equilibria, rationalizable sets, iterated elimination of never-best responses, and iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and we study their properties and relationships. We develop a class of possibilistic strategic games called possibilistic supermodular games to relate supermodular games to possibilistic strategic games. Lastly, we discuss a direction of extending our possibilistic framework to games with incomplete information.

我们将可能性信念引入战略游戏，将玩家对其对手策略的信念描述为他认为可能的策略集。我们制定了可能性战略博弈，其中每个玩家都根据他对对手策略的可能性信念来偏好自己的策略。我们为可能的战略博弈定义了几个解决方案概念，例如（严格）均衡、可合理化的集合、非最佳响应的迭代消除和严格支配策略的迭代消除，并且我们研究了它们的属性和关系。我们开发了一类称为可能性超模块游戏的可能性策略游戏，将超模块游戏与可能性策略游戏联系起来。最后，