Recent scholarship has shed more light on the relationship between Husserl and Lotze. And Husserl indeed claims of Lotze that “his inspired interpretation of the Platonic doctrine of Forms […] put up a bright first light and determined all further studies” (2002a, 297). In this paper I will try to answer the question what exactly Husserl saw in this “bright light”—the answer being much more complicated than “Platonism.” As I will show, Lotze misreads Plato, but in interesting ways, and Husserl in turn misreads Lotze. In other words, this paper is about a misreading of a misreading—yet one fundamental for the development of phenomenology in that Husserl’s engagement with Lotze enabled him (a) to expand and differentiate his own anti-reductionism in regard to ideal entities, leading him to two forms of what he calls “Platonism,” one of which even runs contrary to Lotze’s own account, and (b) to conceive of a method to gain truths about the material apriori. After a brief introduction, I will discuss (1) Lotze’s interpretation of Plato, (2) what Husserl took from it, and finally (3) Plato’s Platonism, to substantiate my claims¹.

最近的学术研究更多地阐明了胡塞尔和洛策之间的关系。胡塞尔确实声称洛策“他对柏拉图形式学说的启发性解释 [...] 亮起了第一道曙光，并决定了所有进一步的研究”（2002a，297）。在本文中，我将尝试回答胡塞尔在这“亮光”中到底看到了什么——这个答案比“柏拉图主义”要复杂得多。正如我将要表明的，洛采误读了柏拉图，但方式很有趣，而胡塞尔反过来又误读了洛采。换句话说，这篇论文是关于对一种误读的误读——然而，这是现象学发展的一个基础，因为胡塞尔与洛策的接触使他 (a) 扩展和区分了他自己关于理想实体的反还原论，引导他他称之为“柏拉图主义”的两种形式，” 其中一个甚至与 Lotze 自己的解释相反，并且 (b) 构想一种方法来获得关于物质先验的真理。简要介绍后，我将讨论（1）洛采对柏拉图的解释，（2）胡塞尔从中吸取了什么，最后（3）柏拉图的柏拉图主义，以证实我的主张¹ .