Institutionalized discrimination between foreign and domestic investors exists in many countries. We examine the differential effects of foreign investor protection (FIP) and domestic investor protection (DIP) on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). To guide our empirical analysis, we first present a model in which, when faced with differentiated FIP and DIP, a firm chooses between investing domestically and investing in a foreign country via M&A. The model predicts that cross-border M&As are more likely to occur when in the target country FIP becomes stronger or DIP becomes weaker. The effects are more pronounced in contract-intensive industries. We then construct a data set of worldwide cross-border M&A deals over the period of 1988–2014 and empirically test the model predictions. Our empirical findings support the theoretical predictions. In addition, we find that the effects are stronger (a) for M&As with larger acquired shares, (b) in target countries farther away from the home countries, and (c) in target countries with better financial development.

许多国家都存在外国和国内投资者之间制度化的歧视。我们研究了外国投资者保护 (FIP) 和国内投资者保护 (DIP) 对跨境并购 (M&A) 的不同影响。为了指导我们的实证分析，我们首先提出一个模型，在该模型中，当面临差异化的 FIP 和 DIP 时，公司会在国内投资和通过并购投资国外之间做出选择。该模型预测，当目标国家的 FIP 变强或 DIP 变弱时，跨国并购更有可能发生。这种影响在合同密集型行业更为明显。然后，我们构建了 1988 年至 2014 年期间全球跨境并购交易的数据集，并对模型预测进行了实证检验。我们的实证研究结果支持理论预测。此外，我们发现效果更强（a）收购份额较大的并购，（b）离母国较远的目标国家，以及（c）金融发展较好的目标国家。