ABSTRACT

Scholars have demonstrated that deliberation between political actors in states as well as in International Organizations (IOs) matters because it can impact the quality and legitimacy of outcomes. Yet, we do not know much about how deliberation between political actors can be triggered in practice. Drawing on insights from the deliberative turn that has taken place in Comparative Politics as well as insights from International Relations, this paper inquires how different IO institutional features effect the extent of diplomatic deliberation. Unique and novel survey data shows that there is variation between and within IOs. In some IOs, such as the UNFCCC or CoE, diplomats engage in extensive deliberations, while they do so considerably less in others, such as the UNWTO or IWC. Our paper provides novel insights into the inner working of IOs. In general, diplomatic debates are most pronounced in large IOs with high level delegates that often opt for negotiating behind closed doors. In addition, specific institutional design elements matter in the different stages of an IO policy-cycle, such as procedural rules fostering interaction between diplomats in the negotiation stage or a limited policy scope in the voting stage.

摘要

学者们已经证明，国家和国际组织 (IO) 中的政治参与者之间的商议很重要，因为它会影响结果的质量和合法性。然而，我们对如何在实践中触发政治参与者之间的协商知之甚少。借鉴比较政治学中发生的协商转向的见解以及国际关系中的见解，本文探讨了不同的 IO 制度特征如何影响外交协商的程度。独特而新颖的调查数据表明，IO 之间和内部存在差异。在一些国际组织中，例如 UNFCCC 或 CoE，外交官参与广泛的审议，而在其他组织中，他们这样做的情况要少得多，例如 UNWTO 或 IWC。我们的论文对 IO 的内部工作提供了新颖的见解。一般来说，外交辩论在拥有高层代表的大型国际组织中最为明显，这些组织通常选择闭门谈判。此外，具体的制度设计要素在信息作战政策周期的不同阶段很重要，例如在谈判阶段促进外交官之间互动的程序规则或在投票阶段限制政策范围。