A large body of game-theoretic work examines the process by which uncertainty can lead to inefficient war. In a typical crisis bargaining model, players negotiate according to a pre-specified game form and no player has the ability to change the rules of the game. However, when one of the parties has full bargaining power and is able to set the rules of the game on her own, the game itself becomes an endogenous decision variable. I formulate this problem in a principal-agent framework. I show that both the likelihood of costly war and the exact mechanism that yields it depend on the nature of the informational problem and the identity of the informed player.

中文翻译：

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危机谈判中的议价能力

大量博弈论研究考察了不确定性导致低效战争的过程。在典型的危机谈判模型中，玩家按照预先指定的游戏形式进行谈判，没有玩家有能力改变游戏规则。然而，当其中一方拥有充分的议价能力并能够自行制定游戏规则时，游戏本身就成为内生决策变量。我在委托代理框架中阐述了这个问题。我表明，代价高昂的战争的可能性和产生战争的确切机制都取决于信息问题的性质和知情参与者的身份。