Abstract

This study examines rule non-compliance from police officers and managers who decide not to enforce certain public health edicts and decrees. It examines rule non-compliance from police officers and managers who decide not to enforce certain public health edicts and decrees. The locus of our study is the severity of the consequences for rule non-compliance for citizens. We test to see whether rules with severe punishments for citizens are broken, bent, or worked around by the police more often than expected in Bozeman observations. Thirty-seven police chiefs and managers were interviewed. Sixteen focus groups totaling 149 police officers were held in 15 municipalities in a Canadian province. Non-compliance related to police officers not enforcing 1556 Canadian dollars (US$1260; 1082€) fines was high. This study provides credence that workaround is a flexible concept explaining how discretion is used on the frontlines of public service.

摘要

这项研究调查了决定不执行某些公共卫生法令和法令的警察和管理人员不遵守规则的情况。它审查决定不执行某些公共卫生法令和法令的警察和管理人员的违规行为。我们研究的重点是不遵守规则对公民造成的后果的严重性。我们测试了对公民进行严厉惩罚的规则是否比博兹曼观察中预期的更频繁地被警察破坏、歪曲或变通。三十七名警察局长和管理人员接受了采访。加拿大一个省的 15 个市镇共举行了 16 个焦点小组，共 149 名警察。与警察未执行 1556 加元（1260 美元；1082 欧元）罚款相关的违规行为非常多。