ABSTRACT

Local governments often provide tax-subsidy programs to attract corporate investment. Using a game-theoretic real options model between a firm and a government, this paper aims to explore the interaction between the government’s tax-subsidy policy and the firm’s investment and financing decisions. The optimal incentive policies are derived for cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining settings between a government and a firm. We show that it is optimal for the government to offer a tax-subsidy combination in the cooperative setting. However, this is not true for the non-cooperative setting, in which the optimal policy is to only levy taxes with no investment subsidy. Whereas firms always have an incentive to rely on debt financing in the non-cooperative setting, firms are reluctant to issue debt in the cooperative setting. Finally, it is generally optimal for the government to collect taxes at a lower rate in the case of high risk high-tech enterprises.

摘要

地方政府经常提供税收补贴计划来吸引企业投资。本文使用企业与政府之间的博弈论实物期权模型，旨在探讨政府税收补贴政策与企业投融资决策之间的相互作用。最优激励政策是针对政府与企业之间的合作和非合作谈判环境得出的。我们表明，政府在合作设置中提供税收补贴组合是最优的。然而，对于非合作环境而言，情况并非如此，在这种情况下，最优政策是只征税而没有投资补贴。在非合作环境下，企业总是有依赖债务融资的动机，而在合作环境下，企业则不愿意发行债务。最后，