In a 2019 paper, Hausmann raised a new and interesting problem for Kripke’s account of negative existentials. He argued that Kripke’s account leads to the absurd consequence that anybody who has good reasons to believe that there are no propositions also has good reasons to believe that he or she does not exist. In this paper I propose a modified Kripkean theory, which is invulnerable to a Hausmann-like argument. As will be seen, the modified theory can be squarely justified in light of the key observations behind Kripke’s original proposal.

中文翻译：

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修正的克里普克消极存在主义理论

在 2019 年的一篇论文中，豪斯曼针对克里普克对消极存在主义的解释提出了一个有趣的新问题。他争辩说，克里普克的解释导致了一个荒谬的结果，即任何有充分理由相信不存在命题的人也有充分理由相信他或她不存在。在这篇论文中，我提出了一种改进的克里普克理论，它不受类豪斯曼论证的影响。正如将会看到的那样，根据克里普克最初提议背后的关键观察结果，可以完全证明修改后的理论是正确的。