Contemporary population ethics is dominated by views that aggregate by summing, whether of well-being or of some construct based on well-being. In contrast, average well-being is generally considered axiologically irrelevant. To many of us, however, the number of future people does not seem important, as long as it is sufficient to enable rich and varied life experiences, and as long as the population continues throughout time. It therefore seems relatively plausible to aggregate future well-being by averaging. In particular, it seems plausible to value high average well-being at any particular time, and to do so for all future times. I present a time-sensitive version of the Average View that underpins such axiological intuitions. I also address a series of issues and objections that confront such a view.

当代人口伦理学的主导观点是通过求和来汇总的观点，无论是关于福祉还是基于福祉的某种建构。相比之下，平均幸福感通常被认为与价值论无关。然而，对我们中的许多人来说，未来人口的数量似乎并不重要，只要足以实现丰富多样的生活体验，并且人口数量在整个时间段内持续存在即可。因此，通过平均来汇总未来的福祉似乎相对合理。特别是，在任何特定时间重视高平均幸福感似乎是合理的，并且在未来的所有时间都如此。我提出了一个支持这种价值直觉的平均观点的时间敏感版本。我还解决了面对这种观点的一系列问题和反对意见。