International lawyers ascribe to the lex specialis principle three distinctly different meanings. Thus, lex specialis is referred to, first, as a norm designed to resolve conflicts between entire categories of norms; secondly, as a norm designed to resolve conflicts on a case-by-case basis; and, thirdly, as a rule of interpretation designed to avoid the occurrence of normative conflicts, rather than to resolve them. Scholars have attempted to explain this divergent use of legal language. In so doing, they have consistently had their focus on the different mind-sets or inclinations of lawyers active in different branches of international law. Symptomatic is Marko Milanović, who pictured the divergent use of lex specialis as a reflection of a debate waged between “human rights enthusiasts” and “human rights sceptics”. This article approaches the issue at a different level of abstraction. As it argues, the divergent use of lex specialis is the result of users’ different conceptions of an international legal system. Thus, lawyers conceive differently of the lex specialis principle, depending on whether they take the position of a legal positivist, a legal idealist or a legal realist. In no case are lawyers equipped to conceive of this principle in all of its three senses.

国际律师赋予特别法原则三种截然不同的含义。因此，特别法首先被称为旨在解决整个规范类别之间冲突的规范；其次，作为旨在逐案解决冲突的规范；第三，作为一项解释规则，旨在避免规范冲突的发生，而不是解决它们。学者们试图解释法律语言的这种不同使用。在此过程中，他们始终关注活跃于国际法不同分支的律师的不同心态或倾向。马尔科·米兰诺维奇（Marko Milanovic）就是典型的例子，他描绘了特别法的不同使用反映了“人权狂热者”和“人权怀疑论者”之间的争论。本文从不同的抽象层次来探讨这个问题。文章认为，特别法的不同使用是使用者对国际法律体系不同概念的结果。因此，律师对特别法原则的理解不同，取决于他们是采取法律实证主义者、法律唯心主义者还是法律现实主义者的立场。在任何情况下，律师都没有能力从所有三个意义上理解这一原则。