The cognitive revolution has left its mark on institutional theory in sociology and political science. Cognitive structures – schemas, typifications, frames and ideas – are recognized as a crucial variable of social behavior, institutional development and collective action. However, while the assertion that “ideas matter” is widely shared, institutional theorists are still struggling with the question of how ideas matter, especially in motivational terms. The role of ideas not just as switchmen, in Weber’s terms, but as genuine drivers of collective action still lacks theoretical underpinning. This article aims at closing this gap. It elaborates a theoretical model to explain how ideas shift the structure of motivation from the individual to the collective level. Borrowing from motivational psychology and social philosophy, especially from the work of John Searle, two crucial mechanisms are explicated. The first one is imagination, a specific mental state that allows collectivizing the intentional structure of beliefs and affords a sense of self-efficacy in collective contexts. The second one is plural self-awareness, a mechanism that shifts intentions-in-action to the collective level.

认知革命在社会学和政治学的制度理论中留下了自己的印记。认知结构——图式、典型化、框架和想法——被认为是社会行为、制度发展和集体行动的关键变量。然而，虽然“思想很重要”的说法得到广泛认同，但制度理论家仍在努力解决如何想法很重要，尤其是在激励方面。用韦伯的话说，思想的作用不仅是开关手，而且是集体行动的真正驱动力，但仍然缺乏理论基础。本文旨在缩小这一差距。它阐述了一个理论模型来解释想法如何将动机结构从个人层面转变为集体层面。借用动机心理学和社会哲学，尤其是约翰·塞尔的著作，阐明了两个重要的机制。第一个是想象力，一种特定的精神状态，它允许集体化信念的有意结构，并在集体环境中提供自我效能感。第二个是多元自我意识，一种将行动意图转移到集体层面的机制。