While the idea that thinking is a form of silent self-talk goes back at least to Plato, it is not immediately clear how to state this thesis precisely. The aim of the paper is to spell out the notion that we think in language by recourse to recent work on inner speech. To that end, inner speech and overt speech are briefly compared. I then propose that inner speaking be defined as a mental episode that substantially engages the speech production system; the underlying model of speech production is sketched. Next, the cognitive role of inner speaking is explored, especially its role in thinking and reasoning. The question of whether it is a way of making thoughts accessible (to whomever) or whether it is a means of thinking itself is raised. I argue that there are two reasons for assuming that, occasionally, we think in language. More specifically, I will claim that some instances of thinking are instances of inner speaking as they exploit certain properties of natural language, and that some instances of inner speaking are instances of thinking as they play a decisive role in paradigmatic cases of thinking that result from internalizing and re-using certain social-linguistic practices. Finally, the Language-of-Thought hypothesis as an alternative account is critically discussed.

虽然思考是一种无声的自我对话的想法至少可以追溯到柏拉图，但目前还不清楚如何准确地陈述这个论点。这篇论文的目的是通过最近关于内心语言的研究来阐明我们用语言思考的概念。为此，对内在言语和外在言语进行了简要比较。然后，我建议将内心的说话定义为一种实质上参与言语产生系统的心理情节；概述了语音生成的基本模型。接下来，探索内在说话的认知作用，特别是它在思考和推理中的作用。问题是它是一种让思想（对任何人）可用的方式，还是它本身就是一种思考方式。我认为有两个理由可以假设我们偶尔会用语言思考。进一步来说，我会声称，一些思维实例是内在言说的实例，因为它们利用了自然语言的某些特性，而一些内在言说的实例是思维的实例，因为它们在内化和再思考产生的范式思维案例中起着决定性的作用。 -使用某些社会语言实践。最后，批判性地讨论了作为替代解释的思想语言假设。