Egalitarian considerations play a central role in many areas of social choice theory. Applications of egalitarian principles range from ensuring everyone gets an equal share of a cake when deciding how to divide it, to guaranteeing balance with respect to gender or ethnicity in committee elections. Yet, the egalitarian approach has received little attention in judgment aggregation—a powerful framework for aggregating logically interconnected issues. We make the first steps towards filling that gap. We introduce axioms capturing two classical interpretations of egalitarianism in judgment aggregation and situate these within the context of existing axioms in the pertinent framework of belief merging. We then explore the relationship between these axioms and several notions of strategyproofness from social choice theory at large. Finally, a novel egalitarian judgment aggregation rule stems from our analysis; we present complexity results concerning both outcome determination and strategic manipulation for that rule.

平等主义的考虑在社会选择理论的许多领域发挥着核心作用。平等主义原则的应用范围很广，从确保每个人在决定如何分配蛋糕时获得平等份额，到保证委员会选举中性别或种族的平衡。然而，平均主义方法在判断聚合中很少受到关注——判断聚合是聚合逻辑上相互关联的问题的强大框架。我们迈出了填补这一空白的第一步。我们引入公理来捕捉判断聚合中平均主义的两种经典解释，并将它们置于信念合并相关框架中现有公理的背景下。然后，我们探讨了这些公理与社会选择理论中的几个策略证明性概念之间的关系。最后，一种新颖的均等主义判断聚合规则源于我们的分析；我们提出了关于该规则的结果确定和战略操纵的复杂性结果。