Although most scholars recommend making the first offer in negotiations, recent research and practitioners' experience have uncovered a second-mover advantage in certain situations. In the current article, we explore this first- versus second-mover dynamic by investigating the circumstances under which negotiators would make less favorable first offers than they would receive were they to move second, focusing on the effects of negotiation power in the form of alternatives. Additionally, we examine the effects of low power on reservation prices and whether these effects could be mitigated using an anchor-debiasing technique. In Study 1, we manipulated negotiators' power in the form of the best alternative to the negotiated agreement and examined its effect on first offers and reservation prices. Our results showed that low-power negotiators would receive more favorable first offers than they would have made themselves when facing either low- or medium-power counterparts. Also, our results suggest that low-power negotiators had less favorable reservation prices than their medium- and high- power counterparts. In Study 2, we investigated whether this effect would persist in the face of anchor-debiasing techniques. Our results showed that while anchor-debiasing techniques did improve their first offers, low-power negotiators would still benefit from making the counteroffer rather than moving first. Our findings uncover the disadvantageous effects of low power on first-offer magnitude while offering practical advice to negotiators.

中文翻译：

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低权力、首次报价和保留价格：弱势谈判者被自己的替代方案自我锚定

尽管大多数学者都建议在谈判中先发制人，但最近的研究和从业者的经验已经揭示了在某些情况下的先发优势。在当前的文章中，我们通过调查谈判者提出的第一个报价不如他们在第二个移动时收到的优惠的情况来探讨这种先行者与后行者的动态关系，重点关注备选方案形式的谈判能力的影响. 此外，我们还研究了低功率对预订价格的影响，以及是否可以使用锚定偏差技术来减轻这些影响。在研究 1 中，我们以谈判协议的最佳替代方案的形式操纵谈判者的权力，并检验其对首次报价和保留价格的影响。我们的结果表明，与低权力或中等权力的谈判对手相比，低权力谈判者会收到更有利的首次报价。此外，我们的结果表明，低权力谈判者的保留价格低于中高权力谈判者。在研究 2 中，我们调查了这种效应是否会在锚定去偏技术面前持续存在。我们的结果表明，虽然锚定偏差技术确实改善了他们的第一个报价，但低权力谈判者仍然会从还价而不是先行中受益。我们的研究结果揭示了低权力对首次报价幅度的不利影响，同时为谈判者提供了实用建议。