We examine the relationship between firm-sponsored training and product quality competition within a model of worker–firm bargaining. We develop a quality-adjusted monopolistically competitive setting in which firms invest in training to an extent that reflects: (i) the costs of training, (ii) the extent to which training increases product quality, and (iii) the extent to which product quality increases final product demand. We identify the conditions under which greater sensitivity between product demand and quality results in greater firm-sponsored training.

中文翻译：

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质量竞赛和工人培训

我们在工人与企业讨价还价的模型中研究了企业赞助的培训与产品质量竞争之间的关系。我们建立了一个质量调整的垄断竞争环境，在该环境中，企业对培训的投资反映了：（i）培训成本，（ii）培训提高产品质量的程度，以及（iii）产品提高的程度。质量增加了最终产品的需求。我们确定了在什么条件下产品需求和质量之间的敏感性越高，公司赞助的培训就越多。