Philosophical accounts of status understand it either pejoratively, as social rank, or laudatorily, as the dignity possessed by all in virtue of our shared humanity. Status is considered to be something either we all have or no one should have. This article aims to show that there is a third, neglected, sense of status. It refers to the moral rights and duties one holds in virtue of one’s social position or role. Employees, refugees, doctors, teachers and judges all hold social roles in virtue of which they have distinctive obligations, rights, privileges, powers and the like. This article aims to do two things: first, to distinguish the role-based notion of status from ideas of social rank, and to identify the various ways in which it constitutes a distinct category of moral wrongdoing; and second, to show that status, thus understood, is justified on egalitarian grounds even though, unlike dignity, not everyone has it. The moral point of status, I argue, is to regulate asymmetrical relations in which one of the parties suffers from background vulnerabilities and dependencies. Status as a moral idea vests both parties with a complex set of rights and duties, whose aim is to restore moral equality between the parties.

中文翻译：

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危害地位罪

对地位的哲学解释要么贬义地理解为社会等级，要么赞美地理解为所有人因共同的人性而享有的尊严。地位被认为是我们所有人都拥有或没有人应该拥有的东西。本文旨在表明存在第三种被忽视的地位感。它是指一个人因其社会地位或角色而享有的道德权利和义务。雇员、难民、医生、教师和法官都具有社会角色，因此他们有不同的义务、权利、特权、权力等。本文旨在做两件事：首先，将基于角色的地位概念与社会等级观念区分开来，并确定它构成不同类别的道德不法行为的各种方式；其次，为了表明这种地位，因此理解，尽管与尊严不同，并不是每个人都拥有尊严，但基于平等主义的理由是合理的。我认为，地位的道德意义在于调节不对称关系，其中一方存在背景脆弱性和依赖性。地位作为一种道德观念赋予双方一套复杂的权利和义务，其目的是恢复双方之间的道德平等。