ABSTRACT

Many metaethicists endorse a cognitive constraint which links the reasons for which we act or hold attitudes (motivating reasons) to normative reasons (reasons that speak in favour of an action or attitude). As traditionally formulated, this constraint (known as the Taking Condition) requires that an agent’s motivating reasons are mentally represented by her as corresponding normative reasons. In response to the charge that the Taking Condition is overly demanding, Errol Lord and Kurt Sylvan have proposed a reformulation which eschews the need for normative representation (Lord and Sylvan 2019 [“Prime Time (for the Basing Relation).” In Well-Founded Belief, edited by J. Adam Carter, and Patrick Bondy, 141–173. London and New York: Routledge]). As they argue, agents must treat their motivating reasons as normative reasons, where this notion picks out a specific set of dispositions rather than a representational state. I argue that this proposal seriously distorts our understanding of the relation between an action or attitude and the reasons for which we perform or hold it. On the plausible assumption that an account of motivating reasons should not stray too far from this understanding, this response to the over-demandingness charge thus fails. I also provide some directions on how friends of the Taking Condition should instead respond this charge.

摘要

许多元伦理学家认可一种认知约束，它将我们采取行动或持有态度的原因（动机原因）与规范原因（支持某种行为或态度的原因）联系起来。按照传统的表述，这种约束（称为“采取条件”）要求代理人的激励原因在心理上由她代表为相应的规范原因。为了回应“获取条件”过于苛刻的指控，Errol Lord 和 Kurt Sylvan 提出了一种重新表述，避免了规范性表示的需要（Lord 和 Sylvan 2019 [“黄金时间（用于基础关系）”。在 Well-Founded 中）信仰，J. Adam Carter 和 Patrick Bondy 编辑，141-173。伦敦和纽约：劳特利奇]）。正如他们所说，代理人必须将他们的激励原因视为规范原因，这个概念挑选出一组特定的倾向，而不是代表性的状态。我认为这一提议严重扭曲了我们对行为或态度与我们采取或持有该行为或态度的原因之间关系的理解。基于对激励原因的解释不应偏离这种理解太远的合理假设，这种对过度要求指控的回应因此失败了。我还提供了一些关于采取条件的朋友应该如何回应这项指控的指示。