We analyze the introduction of capitation taxes as a mean of regulating professional services in a Principal-Agent moral-hazard framework. Although the tax increases cost and lowers participation, we find that it reduces the marginal price associated with quality. The optimal capitation system balances these opposing effects. We use the setup to derive comparative statics results and discuss possible impacts of improvements in ICT on occupational regulation. We find that the results are more ambiguous than often suggested.

中文翻译：

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人头税和专业服务监管

我们分析了引入人头税作为在委托代理道德风险框架中规范专业服务的一种手段。尽管税收增加了成本并降低了参与度，但我们发现它降低了与质量相关的边际价格。最优的按人头付费制度平衡了这些相反的影响。我们使用该设置得出比较静态结果，并讨论 ICT 改进对职业监管的可能影响。我们发现结果比通常建议的更加模糊。